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Abstract 
In p residential  primaries ,  Sup er  Tuesday electio ns  pl ay a  s ig ni f i ca nt  role  i n  wi nno wing  candid a te f ields  
a nd es tabl ish ing  no mi na tio n f ro ntrunners .   Desp i te their  i mporta nce,  s ch ola rs  kno w l itt l e  ab o ut why a nd 
h o w ca ndid a tes  wi n o r  los e  th e s ta tes  co mp ris i ng  th es e events .   Th is  s tud y explo res  wh i ch  f actors  h elp 
expl ain candidate p erfo rmance in S up er Tuesd ay p rimaries  b etween 2008 and 2016.   Us ing poo led cros s-
s ectio nal  t i me-s eries  anal ys is ,  th e res ul ts  ind icate th ree key drivers  of  Sup er  Tuesd ay s uccess :  cand id a te 
vi ab il i ty ,  public  a ttentio n,  and  med ia  a ttenti on.   Th es e f inding s imply that  while  there are  s imilarit ies  
b etween S uper Tuesd ay s and th e b roader explanations of  p residential  p rimary res ul ts ,  there a re  
op por tuniti es  fo r  ups ta rt  cand ida tes  to  imp ro ve th eir  p erfor ma nce vi s-à- vis  f ro ntrunners ,  pa rti cul arl y  
s ince wi nning  p rio r  p ri ma ri es  o r  ca ucus es  are  no t a  uniquely  s ig nif i ca nt p redi cto r  i n  our  mo dels .   F uture 
res earch  s ho uld  expl ore the interrelated ness  of  th es e th ree critical  factors  as  well  as  ho w campaig ns  
s tra teg i cal l y  a ttemp t to  i nfl uence S up er  Tuesd ay vo ters .  
 
Keywords 




On February 5, 2008, 23 states participated in a Democratic Party presidential primary 
or caucus pitting Barack Obama against Hillary Clinton.  With nearly 1,700 delegates at stake, 
this “Super Duper Tuesday” event had the potential to alter the course of what had been a tight 
battle for the party’s nomination (Schneider 2007).  Instead, the candidates split the delegates 
(with a slight edge for Obama), the popular vote (with a slight edge to Clinton), and the number 
of states won (with a slight edge for Obama).  That same day, Republicans in 21 states voted for 
their preferred presidential candidate.  Despite a narrow popular vote win by John McCain over 
Mitt Romney, McCain won nearly two-thirds of the available delegates and cemented his status 
as the party’s front-runner for the nomination (Sullivan and Luo 2008). 
There a few ways in which Super Tuesdays play a significant role in the presidential 
nomination process.  They provide information to voters by signaling a candidate’s momentum 
and viability, as happened in the 2008 Democratic primary, which can result in increased 
fundraising (Steger 2008).  They can serve to winnow the field of candidates, as those who 
perform poorly – in terms of both delegates won and expectations – may drop out of the race 
(Norrander 2000).  Finally, they may signify the end of a competitive nomination battle, as 
exhibited in the 2008 GOP race. 
Despite the importance of Super Tuesdays, elections scholars know little about why and 
how candidates win or lose the states comprising these events, nor do we know whether they 
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empirically differ from other primary election events, such as Iowa, New Hampshire, or the 
overall contested primary vote (CPV).  This study attempts to fill this gap by first detailing the 
role these events play in the nomination process.  We then explore whether traditional 
explanations of presidential primary outcomes apply to this context.  Using pooled cross-
sectional time-series analysis, we identify three key drivers of Super Tuesday performance: 
viability, public attention, and media attention.  These results suggest that while there are 
similarities between Super Tuesdays and the broader explanations of presidential primary results, 
there are opportunities for upstart candidates to improve their performance vis-à-vis 
frontrunners. 
 
Super Tuesday Primaries 
Super Tuesdays are largely a product of the “front-loading” phenomenon in presidential 
primaries.  State legislators noticed the amount of attention given to Iowa and New Hampshire, 
both by presidential candidates and the media, as well as the reality that post-McGovern-Frasier 
Commission presidential nominations were being settled early in the process, and decided to 
move their primary or caucus to earlier in the calendar (Ridout and Rottinghaus 2008).  The 
desire to attract attention and play a greater role in determining presidential nominees led some 
states to create the first media-designated Super Tuesday in 1984 (Stanley and Hadley 1987), 
when five states held primaries and another four held caucuses (Mayer and Busch 2004). 
The 1988 primary marked an important strategic shift in Super Tuesdays: the creation 
of a regional election.  After the Reagan general election victories in 1980 and 1984, southern 
states were frustrated by the Democratic Party’s lack of success in general elections, particularly 
in their region, the perceived inability of a conservative Democrat to win the party’s nomination, 
and the amount of attention given to Iowa and New Hampshire.  In what Hadley and Stanley 
(1989, 23) describe as an “organizational success”, every southern state agreed to hold their 
primary or caucus on the same day.  Combined with some non-southern states, one-third of all 
delegates were up for grabs that day, an event spanning 16 states, 121 media markets, and 171 
congressional districts (Norrander 1992; Hadley and Stanley 1989).  While scholars found little 
evidence that the southern states were effective in their goals (Hadley and Stanley 1989; 
Norrander 1992), the idea of regional primary events did not go away, with 1996’s “Yankee 
Primary” and “Big 10 Primary” serving as examples of geographic regions attempting to influence 
presidential nomination outcomes (Ridout and Rottinghaus 2008).  If anything, Super Tuesdays 
became bigger after 1988, culminating in the 2008 event that involved close to two dozen states 
between the two major parties. 
The combination of front-loading and Super Tuesdays has implications for the type of 
candidates that can win a primary.  Front-loaded primaries require candidates to raise more 
money during the invisible primary – the time between when candidates announce they are 
running and the Iowa caucuses – in order to have a large enough campaign organization in 
multiple states at once.  As Mayer and Busch (2004) point out, this amounts to an entrance fee 
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just to run for president, one that most candidates are unable to afford (Norrander 2000).  
Finally, Hadley and Stanley (1989) present compelling evidence that the 1988 southern state 
strategy aimed at nominating a more moderate Democrat backfired, arguing that the presence of 
multiple candidates with southern roots helped keep the more liberal Michael Dukakis campaign 
alive as Jesse Jackson and Al Gore split the southern delegate pool.  Furthermore, Gore’s 
candidacy was only viable in the South; with every state in the region voting on Super Tuesday, 
there were no other winnable states on the calendar, thus depriving him of receiving any 
momentum later in the campaign. 
Despite the increased size and frequency of Super Tuesdays (Norrander 2010), elections 
scholars have spent little time exploring who wins the states comprising these events and why.  
Many of the studies focusing on Super Tuesday look at the phenomenon from the vantage point 
of the state and/or region.  For instance, states tend to receive more media attention when they 
host a primary earlier in the process (Ridout and Rottinghaus 2008), there are not too many other 
states holding a primary or caucus on the same day (Mayer and Busch 2004), and when more 
delegates are at stake (Gurian 1993; Norrander 1992).  Counter to the southern state strategy of 
1988, Ridout and Rottinghaus (2008) find that geographic proximity – i.e., the regional primary 
– does not significantly increase media attention for the individual state (Gurian 1993).  This 
suggests that if states want to receive more media and candidate attention, states would be wise 
to avoid holding a primary on Super Tuesday. 
 States are not the only entity looking for increased media attention; candidates know 
that unless the media covers their campaign, they have little chance of winning the nomination.  
This is the reality of a sequential primary process and stems from the uniqueness of Iowa and 
New Hampshire receiving their own day in the spotlight.  Candidates who perform better in 
these two states generally do better in Super Tuesday states.  As Redlawsk et al. (2011) find, 25 
percent of 2008 Super Tuesday voters said that winning Iowa was important; another 25 percent 
said the same of New Hampshire.  The clear implication is that Super Tuesdays favor front-
runners and candidates with significant momentum coming out of the early states (Norrander 
2010).  An example of the latter is the 1984 candidacy of Gary Hart.  Hart finished a surprising 
second place in Iowa before rattling off victories in New Hampshire and Vermont.  These 
victories increased his name recognition among Super Tuesday voters from 50 percent to 90 
percent (Bartels 1989). Indeed, even in 1988 as southern states were hoping for candidates to 
ignore the early states, candidates spent more time in Iowa and New Hampshire than all the 
southern states combined (Hadley and Stanley 1989). 
Studies focusing on Super Tuesday results typically include one of two nomination 
cycles: 1988 or 2008 due to the novelty factor (1988) or the number of states involved (2008). 
There is consensus that, while Super Tuesday state results can be volatile (Norrander 1992), they 
often boil down to a few key factors: viability and momentum.  Viability, or the likelihood that a 
candidate can win, is the main factor, as it can supersede momentum.  Presidential primary voters 
can be strategic; they will vote for the candidate they believe will win the primary and/or who 
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they perceive has the best chance of winning in November.  In the 1988 primaries, 10 percent of 
Republicans and 9 percent of Democrats voted for their second choice for this reason (Abramson 
et al. 1992).  The importance of viability played a role in John McCain’s 2008 GOP victory, in 
part due to the lack of a strong front-runner.  Republicans simply viewed him as the most 
electable candidate (Redlawsk, Tolbert, and Donovan 2011).  
The 1988 Democratic primary was somewhat similar in that Michael Dukakis was only 
narrowly ahead in delegates heading into Super Tuesday.  In this case, however, Norrander 
(1992) finds that momentum played an important role in his performance as his support 
increased by 17 percent among voters aware of his New Hampshire primary victory.  
Interestingly, preferences among Republicans were stable coming out of the early primaries; 
George H. W. Bush effectively wrapped up the nomination in part because voters did not 
perceive his rivals to be viable.  One implication of Bush’s victory is that clear front-runners are 
favored unless there is significant momentum behind a candidate (Mayer and Busch 2004).  
Bartels (1989) argues that the closest example of this came in 1984 when Gary Hart over-
performed in every Super Tuesday state due to the momentum he earned from his second-place 
finish in Iowa.   Still, while Hart came close to beating Walter Mondale, momentum alone was 
not enough. 
 
The Importance of Super Tuesdays & Their Distinction from Other Presidential 
Primaries 
Super Tuesdays play an instrumental role in determining who wins a party’s presidential 
nomination, the effects of which are apparent through recent presidential primary history.  Some 
candidates, such as George H.W. Bush in 1988, are able to effectively end the race by dominating 
the Super Tuesday primaries.  For others, like Michael Dukakis, Super Tuesday is about 
performing well enough to justify moving on to the next round of primaries (Norrander 2010, 
1992).  In this lens, Super Tuesdays are not just about establishing a clear winner.  They are an 
attrition game that can have clear losers; candidates who perform poorly typically drop out of the 
race, effectively winnowing a party’s candidate field and clarifying the front-runner.  Thus, Super 
Tuesdays speed up the nomination process after the early primaries and caucuses (Norrander 
2000). 
Super Tuesdays are also unique from the early primaries and caucuses.  Due to the 
sequential nature of the nomination cycle, candidates are able to focus on a couple of states, 
knowing that a poor performance in Iowa or New Hampshire can end their candidacy.  But in 
the lead up to a Super Tuesday, they must choose which states they visit and run ads in 
(Wendland 2017).  Candidates who win one or more early states receive significantly more media 
attention (Bartels 1993) and are seen as more viable candidates (Kenney and Rice 1984).  These 
realities provide Super Tuesday voters with more information about the surviving candidates as 
well as an opportunity to alter the state of the race for subsequent voters. 
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This distinction between the early primary/caucus states and Super Tuesday, combined 
with frontloading, allows for different types of candidates to win states.  Wendland (2017) notes 
that presidential primary candidates are strategic in their use of campaign resources, messaging, 
and advertising in attempting to win delegates throughout the primary season.  This includes 
their preparations for Super Tuesday states, as candidates understand that success in these events 
are paramount to both winning the nomination and staying in the race.  Unlike in the early states, 
it is more difficult for a campaign to achieve parity in candidate visits, although well-resourced 
candidates may have a significant presence in the Super Tuesday states.  As such, upstart 
candidates who win one of the early states but lack the financial resources of a frontrunner can 
perform well in places where their message is well received.  For instance, after winning the 2008 
GOP Iowa caucuses, Mike Huckabee was able to win some southern states (Alabama and 
Georgia) despite trailing John McCain and Mitt Romney in national polling and fundraising.  In 
2012, Rick Santorum won a geographically diverse set of contests – Alaska, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, and Tennessee – despite significantly trailing Mitt Romney in delegates won heading 
into that Super Tuesday. 
 
What is Super Tuesday & What Explains Super Tuesday Performance 
 While the term “Super Tuesday” is frequently cited in media and academic sources, there 
appears to be no standard definition.  One key reason for studying Super Tuesdays is because they 
are winnowing events in an attrition game.  If scholars spend time analyzing Iowa and New 
Hampshire results and their relation to shrinking the pool of candidates, it makes sense that we 
understand other important junctures that can have a similar effect.  The problem with studying 
Super Tuesdays in this lens is that the term itself is not precisely defined by scholars; it is more of 
a label used by the media and political pundits dating back to at least the 1976 presidential 
primaries (UPI 1976).  The size and timing of these electoral events change with the political 
cycle, but there are some common characteristics of what constitutes the media giving a set of 
primaries this label.   
First, there can be multiple Super Tuesdays in a nomination contest.  Norrander (2015) 
notes that in recent presidential primaries, the initial Super Tuesday does not completely end the 
nomination contest.  This extended competitive phase allows additional primaries/caucuses to 
winnow further the candidates, including additional Super Tuesday events.  For instance, the 
2016 contests had three media-designated Super Tuesdays: March 1 (Washington Post 2016), 
March 15 (Bradner 2016), and yet a third on April 26 (Collinson 2016).  Sometimes these Super 
Tuesday events are labeled slightly differently, such as “Super Duper Tuesday” in February 2008, 
when close to two dozen states held either a primary or caucus (Schneider 2007).  Each cycle since 
1976, with the exception of 1988, had more than one competitive Super Tuesday (although the 
term “Super Tuesday” was not formally used in 1976) (see Putnam 2009a).  It is important to 
note that each cycle does not necessarily have multiple Super Tuesdays, but any working 
definition of Super Tuesday must allow for multiple occurrences in the same cycle.   
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The second characteristic of Super Tuesdays is that the media-christened events usually 
included at least five states.  The final Super Tuesday of the 1984 Democratic primary included 
five states: South Dakota, New Mexico, West Virginia, California, and New Jersey  (Church 
1984).  Even the “Mini-Tuesday” in February 2004, consisted of seven states.  The possible 
exception to this characteristic is 2016’s Super Saturday, during which Democratic voters in 
three states and Republican voters in four states went to the polls.  Under this condition, there 
has been at least one Super Tuesday in each presidential primary cycle since 1976 (see Putnam 
2009).  Thus, while it is possible that a cycle could not have such an event, it is historically 
unlikely. 
With Super Tuesday defined, we move next to outlining the potential explanations of a 
candidate’s performance in these events.  To this point, presidential primary scholars focus 
primarily on explaining results from the Iowa caucuses, New Hampshire primaries, and the 
contested/aggregate primary vote (CPV and APV, respectively).  These scholars use a variety of 
factors in an attempt to both explain and predict presidential primary outcomes.  Steger (2007, 
2008; 2013; 2015), Adkins and Dowdle (2002; 2001; 2005), Mayer (2000, 2003), and others 
(Cohen et al. 2008) model at least one of these dependent variables as a function of polling, 
media, endorsements, momentum, cash-on-hand, and/or public attention. 
 
Polling 
 Haynes et al. (2004) identify three main resources of a presidential primary campaign: 
polling, press, and money.  Polling is a direct measure of where a candidate stands in a given race.  
Although it is not a perfect predictor of who will win an election or nomination, candidates who 
poll better perform better.  In this sense, polling is a standard explanatory variable when modeling 
presidential primary results because it is an indicator of support heading into an election (Mayer 
2003, 1996b).  Primary polling is important theoretically because it can signify which contests 
are divisive (Mayer 1996a).  Similar to Haynes et al.’s (2004) model of candidate exits, strategic 
campaign decisions, such as how to deploy resources for Super Tuesdays, are at least partially 
informed by internal polls as they provide a measure of future success.  Finally, while Steger 
(2007) finds that polling is significant only for Republican nomination battles, the general 
consensus among scholars is that polling helps predict nomination outcomes (Adkins and 
Dowdle 2001; Adkins and Dowdle 2005; Norrander 2006; Mayer 2003).   
 
Media 
 The second of the resource triumvirate, media attention plays a critical role in 
presidential primary campaigns because it helps to tell voters what to think about (Steger 2015).  
Much of the media attention in presidential primaries focuses on the horse race and reflects a 
commercial bias, as the media will portray the races as exciting and/or controversial in an attempt 
to increase ratings (Norrander 2015, 96).  There a couple of specific ways by which media 
attention impacts presidential primaries.  First, candidates who receive a significant amount of 
American Review of Politics  Volume 37 No. 2 
7 
DOI: 10.15763/issn.2374-779X.2020.37.2.1-28 
media attention tend to stay in the race longer (Fei Shen 2008).  Second, media attention can 
help long-shot candidates stay in a primary when they lag the frontrunners in other resources 
(Haynes et al. 2004; Haynes, Flowers, and Gurian 2002).  Finally, media attention helps 
candidate performance in both Iowa and New Hampshire (Donovan and Hunsaker 2009).  
Since this literature finds a positive relationship between media attention and performance, we 
expect the same. 
 
Fundraising 
 Fundraising is the last of the three main resources of a presidential campaign.  As 
Hinckley and Green (1996) note, candidates must prioritize their fundraising organization in 
order to be successful.  At the same time, it is very difficult to measure campaign organization, 
particularly in presidential primaries.  Campaigns that last beyond the early states reshuffle their 
staffs according to financial resources and strategic decisions.  None of these activities are reliably 
recorded.  For instance, Feigenbaum and Shelton (2011) note that since FEC filings allow 
candidates to categorize spending, such reports are very broad and occur infrequently.  Even if 
these reports were more specific and reliable, they would not allow us to measure the quality of 
an organization.  Other conceptualizations of campaign organization, such as campaign field 
offices, are difficult to track during the middle to late stages of a presidential primary due to the 
compressed calendar.  For these reasons, fundraising is frequently used as a proxy for campaign 
organization and/or activities (Curry, Herrnson, and Taylor 2013; Hinckley and Green 1996).  
While candidates can raise money based on their success in primary elections (Aldrich 1980), 
there is less certainty that raising money helps candidates win.  While Adkins and Dowdle (2005; 
2001) find that cash reserves can help scholars predict presidential primary outcomes, Steger 
(2007) finds that this only explains primary results for Democratic candidates.  Still other 
scholars are unable to find evidence that money helps candidates win (Mayer 2003; Swearingen, 
Stiles, and Finneran 2019). 
 
Endorsements 
 Endorsements are another important component of presidential primaries.  Candidates 
seek the support of elected officials in an attempt to raise money and build a winning primary 
coalition (Cohen et al. 2008).   Broadly speaking, endorsements help candidates increase their 
share of the primary vote (Steger 2008), although Steger (2015) argues that this only occurs when 
elites coalesce behind a particular candidate early in the process.  For instance, while elite support 
played a role in the 2008 Democratic primaries (Summary 2010), Swearingen et al. (2019) find 
no evidence of elite influence in the 2016 GOP nomination.  Since a higher share of endorsement 
signals greater cohesion of party elites behind a particular candidate, we expect a positive 
relationship between this factor and Super Tuesday performance. 
 
Momentum 
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 The logic of how momentum plays a role in presidential primaries is straightforward.  A 
candidate wins and/or exceeds expectations in an early primary or caucus, which in turn leads to 
increased media attention and fundraising success.  This combination of more media coverage 
and financial resources then translates into more votes (Steger 2008; Bartels 1988).  While 
momentum is not the only way to win a presidential nomination, it helps explain candidate 
performance in the overall primary (Steger 2008), particularly in Democratic Party contests 
(Steger 2007).  During the 2008 presidential primaries, both John McCain and Barack Obama 
were able to use their stances on the Iraq war into an early state victory and gain enough 
momentum to eventually secure their party’s nomination (Norpoth and Perkins 2011).  Still, 
there is some evidence suggesting that momentum may help candidates improve their relative 
standing among their competitors but not win the nomination (Adkins and Dowdle 2001).  
Recent primaries highlight the fleeting nature of momentum as Mike Huckabee (2008), Rick 
Santorum (2012), and Ted Cruz (2016) each won the first-in-the-nation Iowa caucuses but 
failed to win the GOP nomination.  Among Democrats, Hillary Clinton (2008) and Bernie 
Sanders (2016) won New Hampshire but were unable to translate momentum into the 
nomination.  In keeping with the literature, we expect a positive relationship between 
momentum and Super Tuesday performance. 
 
Public attention 
 Public attention is a relative newcomer to the presidential primary literature and thusfar 
focuses on the invisible primary.  Reuning and Dietrich (2016) find that public interest plays a 
key role in helping the media choose which candidates it covers.  Similarly, Swearingen (2017) 
finds that increased public attention helps presidential candidates raise more money.  Finally, 
public attention also helps explain which candidate wins the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire 
primary as well as the contested primary vote (CPV, or a candidate’s share of the vote while the 
presidential primary is actively contested) (Swearingen, Stiles, and Finneran 2019).  These recent 
findings suggest that the mass public plays a significant role in deciding elections and we expect a 
similar relationship here. 
 
Data & Methods  
In defining our cases, each primary election date with at least five actively contested 
primaries/caucuses was labeled as some sort of Super Tuesday by the media. Thus, we set this as 
the minimum number of states voting for one party’s nomination at five. Across the 2004-2016 
primary cycles, there were nine Super Tuesdays: February 3, 2004; March 2, 2004; February 5, 
2008; March 6, 2012; April 12, 2012; March 1, 2016; March 15, 2016; April 26, 2016; and June 
7, 2016.  All told, this provided us with 429 candidate-election observations. 
Since this manuscript builds on previous scholarships that explores who wins early 
nominating contests, we utilize similar statistical models.  Our dependent variable is a candidate’s 
share of a state’s vote in a given primary or caucus on a Super Tuesday.  This is calculated as the 
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number of votes for a candidate divided by the sum of votes for all candidates still actively running 
at that time.   
In our efforts to understand what contributes to a candidate’s success on Super Tuesday, 
we include a number of explanatory variables.  Many scholars discuss the role of elite 
endorsements in determining the outcome of a presidential primary (Cohen et al. 2008; Whitby 
2014; Summary 2010; Steger 2007, 2015; Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1991).  Similar to 
Swearingen, Stiles, and Finneran (2019), we measure a candidate’s share of endorsement points 
at the time of a given Super Tuesday.  Not all endorsements have an equal bearing (Cohen et al. 
2008), we weight the endorsement points as follows: gubernatorial endorsements are worth 10 
points; U.S. Senator endorsements are worth five points; U.S. Representative endorsements are 
worth one point.  The main reason for our weights is that governors have more control over the 
state party as well as the distribution of funds throughout their state (Ansolabehere and Snyder 
2006) than do U.S. Senators, especially those with greater control over the budgetary process 
(Barrilleaux and Berkman 2003, 409).  We summed the total endorsement points for each 
candidate as of the Super Tuesday and divided it by the total endorsement points awarded on 
that day.  For instance, heading into the March 2, 2004 Democratic Super Tuesday, John Kerry 
received 230 endorsement points out of a total of 305 awarded (or 75.41%).  Our source for the 
endorsement data for 2004, 2008, and 2012 is Democracy In Action; for 2016 it is 
fivethirtyeight.com.1 
Media attention is measured as a candidate’s share of local media stories within a state as 
reported by newlibrary.com, a news-aggregating website that includes not only newspaper stories 
but many local television stories as well.  We searched each candidate’s name in the database over 
the week prior to the Super Tuesday.  To calculate the share of local media attention, we divided 
that candidate’s mentions by the sum of all candidate mentions.  We also looked at the media 
mentions for the two weeks preceding Super Tuesday, but a candidate’s share did not change 
much as the correlation between the one-week and two-week measures was 0.99.2 
Analytically, including polling poses an interesting issue for our models.  Not all polls are 
a valid measurement of where a race stands (Pickup and Johnston 2008) as polls can be inaccurate 
and/or biased (Martin, Traugott, and Kennedy 2005).  Second, polling is often correlated with 
other measures of primary success such as media attention and public attention (e.g. Swearingen, 
Stiles, and Finneran, 2019).  This reality is an important reason why additional public-driven 
measures, such as public attention, should be included in elections models.  In this study, polling 
support is measured as a candidate’s statewide share of the polls in the RealClearPolitics average 
 
1 For more information, see the Democracy In Action endorsement sites for 2004, 2008, and 2012, and the 
fivethirtyeight.com endorsement tracker for 2016. 
2 We also explored using national media attention using data from the Vanderbilt TV News Archive, again for the 
two weeks preceding Super Tuesdays.  The national measures were highly correlated with local media attention (r 
= 0.866 for one week and r = 0.874 for two weeks). 
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heading into Super Tuesday.  However, there were multicollinearity issues when including both 
media attention and public attention in a model.3  We kept both variables in Model 3 in Table 1 
so that readers can see their partial effects on the dependent variable.  Because polling was not 
available for slightly over half of the observations, we drop polling in subsequent models. 
Some recent studies look at the validity of using Google Trends as a measure of public 
attention (Ripberger 2011; Ellis, Ripberger, and Swearingen 2017), as well as its impact on 
election results (Swearingen, Stiles, and Finneran 2019; Reuning and Dietrich 2016).  These 
studies indicate that, while not perfect, Google Trends effectively measures public attention and 
its relationship with political phenomena.  We replicate their measures by calculating a 
candidate’s share of public attention in a given state derived from Google Trends.4  This is done 
by entering each candidate’s name into Google Trends for a party’s candidate field in a particular 
state for the 90 days prior to the primary.  The peak search traffic for a candidate during those 90 
days is a 100; all other scores are relative to that point.  Then we calculated each candidate’s 
average share of the attention for the week heading into the primary For example, for the 
California primary on March 2, 2004, John Kerry’s public attention score averaged 18.29, John 
Edwards’ was 7.71, Dennis Kucinich’s was 7.57, Howard Dean’s was 4.71, and Al Sharpton’s was 
4.51.  These scores total 42.85, so dividing each candidate’s score by that sum provides their share 
of public attention.  We tried different weekly increments for public attention, ranging from one 
week to the full 90 days.  Ultimately, the one-week measure since many exit polls indicates a 
strong plurality of voters decides who to vote for during the week leading up to the primary.  
Furthermore, a candidate’s public attention share did not change much over the increments as 
the correlation between public attention share over the final week and final two weeks was 0.98. 
Next, similar to Adkins and Dowdle (2005) we include a candidate’s share of the cash-
on-hand at the end of the month preceding a Super Tuesday.  The data for this variable comes 
from the monthly FEC filing reports required of candidates once the primary phase of the 
nomination process begins.  The percentage is calculated by taking a candidate’s listed cash-on-
hand totals divided by the sum of all cash-on-hand totals for all candidates of that party still 
actively running at that time.  Since much of the presidential primary focuses on momentum 
(Steger 2007; Norpoth and Perkins 2011; Fei Shen 2008; Donovan and Hunsaker 2009; 
 
3 We use Gujarati’s (2004) work as a reference on multicollinearity.  We explored pair-wise correlations among the 
regressors, none of which were above 0.8, a mark that could distinguish the presence of high collinearity.  We also 
looked at each model’s variance inflation factor (VIF); since media and public attention had VIFs of less than 10, 
we are confident there is not a high degree of multicollinearity due to the inclusion of these regressors.  However, 
these tests indicated that there was evidence of multicollinearity between polling and media attention (for which, 
the VIF was 16.2). 
4 See Ripberger (2011) and Swearingen and Ripberger (2014) for a more detailed look into the validity of Google 
Trends as a measure of public attention. 
American Review of Politics  Volume 37 No. 2 
11 
DOI: 10.15763/issn.2374-779X.2020.37.2.1-28 
Adkins and Dowdle 2001), we add a measure of the share of delegates won by each 
candidate heading into Super Tuesday.5   
In addition to the explanatory variables, we included several controls.  Because candidates 
in large primary fields can split the vote, we added a control for the number of candidates.  We 
explored another control variable for the type of election (primary versus caucus), but it did not 
significantly add to the models.  Finally, we include two candidate-driven dummy variables: one 
for if a Super Tuesday state bordered a candidate’s home state and another if a candidate had a 
long-term personal history in that state.  The latter was generally confined to a candidate’s home 
state with the exceptions of Arkansas for Hillary Clinton and Utah for Mitt Romney.  We limit 
this variable to direct personal experience because there is little evidence that candidates receive 
a regional bounce (Norrander 1992). 
Because the public attention variable is available starting in 2004, we look at all Super 
Tuesday states beginning with that cycle.  This yields a total of 429 observations (each candidate 
by state), 211 of which had an RCP polling average while 218 did not.  Since we have multiple 
candidates in a single-state election, we use fixed effects regression accounting for both factors 
using the “plm” package in R 3.5.1.  Due to the presence of heteroscedasticity, we report robust 
standard errors. 
 
Results & Discussion 
 We run three main models of a candidate’s share of the vote in a Super Tuesday state 
where polling was available.  Due to the presence of multicollinearity between polling and media 
attention, we ran one model without one of the two offending variables and a third that included 
both.  Each model has an adjusted R-square of at least 0.61 and a statistically significant F-
statistic.   
Although Model 1 leaves out the polling variable, there are still a couple of interesting 
findings.  First, public attention is statistically and substantively significant in explaining a 
candidate’s Super Tuesday performance.  For each one percent increase in a candidate’s share of 
public attention, their share of the vote is expected to increase by 0.79 points.  This means that a 
candidate one standard deviation above the mean is expected to receive nearly 39 percent more 
of the vote than the average candidate.   
 The substantive importance of public attention helps us understand the success of some 
presidential primary candidates.  Barack Obama’s candidacy was greatly aided by the amount of 
public attention he received.  Heading into the February 5, 2008 Super Tuesday, he regularly 
received over 60 percent of the public attention compared to his chief rival, Hillary Clinton.  
While polling indicated he trailed Senator Clinton in Alabama and Missouri, he ended up 
 
5 We also looked at the percentage of states won, total states won, total caucuses won, and whether the candidate 
won the Iowa caucuses and/or New Hampshire primary.  Because the nomination process is about winning 
delegates, we settled on this measure of momentum. 
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winning those states.  The same held for Donald Trump’s campaign in the 2016 GOP primary.  
In a field of five candidates heading into the March 1 Super Tuesday, he dominated in public 
attention, garnering well over 60 percent in many of the states.  This helped him pull out a narrow 
victory over Florida Senator Marco Rubio in Virginia and win easily in southern states targeted 
by Ted Cruz, such as Alabama and Georgia. 
The second interesting finding from Model 1 is that the substantive impact of local 
media attention is higher than that of public attention.  A one percent increase in local media 
attention is expected to bring an additional 1.13 percent of support in a Super Tuesday state.   
Greater media attention surrounding front-running candidates certainly helps them solidify 
their status, but it can also help less-known candidates in the right circumstances.  On the 
February 5, 2008 GOP Super Tuesday, Ron Paul (TX) averaged roughly 7.5 percent of the vote 
across the twenty primaries/caucuses.  In the three caucus states where his local media share was 
over 20 percent – Alaska, Minnesota, and Montana – he averaged over 19 percent of the vote. 
When polling is not included, a candidate is expected to receive a nearly nine percent 
bump in performance in states where they have a strong personal history.  This same cannot be 
said for neighboring states, which fails to reach statistical significance.  Also worth noting is that 
Model 1 is the only one for which a candidate’s share of cash-on-hand is significant.  Rather than 
helping a candidate, though, this variable is expected to decrease their performance. 
The next model replaces media attention with polling; while the adjusted R-square 
remains the same, the F-statistic jumps from 45.16 to 131.22.  The key finding in this model is 
that the public-driven measures are the key drivers of candidate performance.  With a coefficient 
of 0.91, polling is strongly significant; in Model 3, which includes media attention, the coefficient 
only drops slightly (0.80).  This indicates that despite some highly publicized misses in predicting 
Super Tuesday outcomes, polling is still a starting point when discussing electoral performance. 
Public attention is significant even when controlling for polling and, in Model 3, media 
attention.  The coefficient for both models is between 0.47 and 0.41, indicating substantive 
significance as well.  The average candidate is expected to add 11.6 – 13.3 percent to their 
performance; above-average candidates (one standard deviation) are expected to add 20.2 – 23.2 
percent.  Again, this underscores the importance of public-driven measures in explaining electoral 
performance. 
There are two changes in Model 2 compared to Model 1.  First, candidates are not 
expected to increase their vote share in personal states, likely due to the inclusion of polling in 
the model.  This finding holds for Model 3 as well.  Candidates are, however, are expected to 
receive a  two percent increase in neighboring states, mirroring other scholars (Norrander 1993) 
that found geography plays a role in Super Tuesday results.  Second, once polling is added to the 
model, cash-on-hand ceases to achieve statistical significance.  This could be due to the post-Iowa 
and New Hampshire that winnows out weaker candidates from the race (Norrander 2006); by 
the time Super Tuesday arrives, many of the remaining candidates have some fundraising ability. 
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Table 1. Models of Polled Super Tuesday States, 2004 – 2016 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Elite-Driven Measures 






























































Adj. R2 0.61 0.83 0.85 
F-Statistic 45.16*** 131.22*** 132.7*** 
N 211 211 211 
Dependent variable is a candidate’s vote share.  Fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  One-tail test where hypothesized. 
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
Finally, Model 3 adds local media attention back into the analysis.  Despite the 
multicollinearity between polling and media attention, there are no changes to the substantive or 
statistical significance of public attention, polling, or the neighbor state bump.  With a coefficient 
of 0.43, the media attention variable is an important driver of Super Tuesday performance.  The 
typical candidate is expected to receive an additional 12 percent from media attention, while 
above-average candidates (by one standard deviation) are expected to get an almost 19 percent 
increase.  The stability of this model suggests that all three consistently significant variables play 
a role in understanding Super Tuesday performance. 
American Review of Politics  Volume 37 No. 2 
14 
DOI: 10.15763/issn.2374-779X.2020.37.2.1-28 
Polling is available for roughly half (211 of 429) cases in our data set.  In order to 
understand who wins Super Tuesday races where there is no polling data, we ran two models that 
removed polling – one for all 429 observations and another for the 218 cases where polling did 
not exist (Table 2).  These models perform well with adjusted R-squares of 0.51 and 0.42, 
respectively, and statistically significant F-statistics (p < 0.001 for both). 
 
Table 2:  Non-Polling-Based Models of Super Tuesday Results, 2004 – 2016 















































Adj. R2 0.51 0.42 
F-Statistic 59.34*** 23.87*** 
N 429 218 
Dependent variable is a candidate’s vote share.  Fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  One-tailed test where hypothesized. 
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Looking at both models, public attention again plays a key role in improving candidate 
performance in Super Tuesday contests.  With a coefficient of 0.53, candidates with above-
average public attention are expected to receive an additional 26 percent of the vote.  Among the 
cases without a polling average, this coefficient drops slightly but is still expected to add 21 
percent to a candidate with above-average public attention.  Taken jointly, these results reiterate 
that public attention is an important metric with which to measure campaign effectiveness. 
Media attention is another factor that helps explain Super Tuesday performance.  In fact, 
sans polling, an additional one percent in local media attention vis-à-vis the opposition is 
expected to add just over one percent to a candidate’s vote total.  This underscores the importance 
of campaign stops and interviews with local media outlets.  Beyond the early primary/caucus 
states when candidates can attack each race singly, a campaign must make strategic decisions 
about where to go.  As Bartels (1985) notes, the candidate is a campaign’s greatest resource, in 
part because of the media attention that follows him/her.  Generating greater media attention is 
not only a sound strategy, it serves as a barometer of who may be performing well in a given state. 
Importantly, Table 2 shows that in some cases, elite endorsements can help explain Super 
Tuesday results.  For all cases, a one-percent increase in endorsements is expected to add 0.13 
percent to a candidate’s vote share; for cases where polling is unavailable, the coefficient is 0.17.  
This indicates that candidates who are able to win an above-average backing of key party elites 
can add between seven and nine percent to their vote share in a Super Tuesday state.  This finding 
reiterates Steger’s (2015) notion that when the establishment is unified, that candidate has a 
much higher chance of performing well in presidential primaries. 
Without polling included in the models, the variable for a candidate’s personal state is 
again significant.  In all observations, a candidate is expected to increase their vote share a bit less 
than 13 percent in personal states; in states without polling available, the impact increase to over 
20 percent.  Finally, cash-on-hand is a statistically significant, negative determinant of Super 
Tuesday performance.  Again, this could be due to the quality of candidates remaining beyond 
the initial primary/caucus states.  
The no polling models are robust in explaining Super Tuesday results when combining 
observations from all four election cycles.  Does this hold when analyzing each cycle 
independently?  It is plausible that there were cycle-specific anomalies that get covered up by the 
overall sample.  For instance, did Howard Dean’s highly-covered scream on the night of the 2004 
Iowa caucuses increase his share of both media and public attention, even though he averaged less 
than ten percent of the vote in the February 3 Super Tuesday?  We note the RCP polling average 
is not included for two reasons.  First, there was a problem with multicollinearity for the 2012 
races between polling and local media attention.  Second, there were relatively few observations 
with polling data in 2004 and 2012, the years when only one party had a contested presidential 
primary.  In order to make comparisons across election cycles, we decided to drop the polling 
variable. 





As Table 3 indicates, the no polling model holds up fairly well when disaggregating the 
cases by election cycle.  Local media attention is a driving factor of Super Tuesday performance, 
as is having a personal history in a state.  There are some differences across the cycles when it 
comes to public attention, which is significant in each cycle except 2004.  This is where we see 
some evidence that the “Dean Scream” may have inflated Howard Dean’s share of the public 
attention.  In the states voting on February 3, Dean averaged 9.96 percent of the vote (fourth 
place among Democratic candidates) but over 20 percent of the public attention share (second 
highest).  One month later, Dean averaged 8.7 percent of the vote, third-highest behind John 
Kerry and John Edwards; by this time, he had dropped to third place in public attention. In 2008, 
Table 3: Regression Models of Super Tuesday Results, by Cycle 


































































Number of Candidates 
1.49 
(0.89) 
----- ----- -4.08 
(2.71) 
Adj. R2 0.42 0.64 0.66 0.53 
F-Statistic 10.68*** 47.56*** 17.08*** 22.22*** 
N 99 128 58 144 
Dependent variable is a candidate’s vote share.  Fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  One-tailed test where hypothesized. 
*p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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public attention was significant, adding an expected 1.19 percent of the vote for each one percent 
increase in attention.  On the Democratic side, Barack Obama received over 57 percent of the 
local media attention heading into Super Tuesday and almost 70 percent of the public attention 
en route to winning 13 of the 22 states.  Among Republicans, John McCain received about 41 
percent of the public attention and 34 percent of the local media attention as he won the plurality 
of Super Tuesday contests.6 
Four years later, local media attention was once again the strongest predictor of Super 
Tuesday results.  This could be due to Ron Paul averaging 34 percent of the public attention but 
only 16 percent of the vote across 14 states and two Super Tuesdays. Still, public attention was 
significant, and each one percentage increase was expected to add about 0.5 points to a 
candidate’s vote share.  In 2016, public attention had a higher coefficient, perhaps in part to the 
dominance of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump in getting people to pay attention to their 
campaigns.  Interestingly, 2016 was the only year for which endorsements were an asset – each 
increase in a candidate’s endorsement share was expected to add 0.11 percent of the vote on Super 
Tuesday.  For above-average candidates, this meant an added six percent of the vote.  Again, these 
models reiterate the strength of both local media attention and public attention as key predictors 
of Super Tuesday results, particularly in the absence of polling data. 
 
 
Table 4:  Regression Models of Super Tuesday Results, by Party 





































6 Because there was only one Super Tuesday in 2008 and our models control for candidate and state fixed-effects, 
the cash-on-hand, share of prior delegates won, and number of candidates variables did not vary along these 
clusters and were thus removed from the model. 
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Table 4: (continued) Regression Models of Super Tuesday Results, by Party 











Adj. R2 0.37 0.66 
F-Statistic 15.07*** 51.55*** 
N 197 232 
Dependent variable is a candidate’s vote share.  Fixed effects regression model with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Finally, because Republicans and Democrats vary in their delegate distribution rules, we 
ran the models for each party (Table 4).  There are some similarities across political party.  Local 
media attention is a statistically significant factor in explaining Super Tuesday vote share (b = 
1.09 for Democrats and 1.02 for Republicans) and having a primary/caucus in a home state can 
add around 12-14 percent to a candidate’s total.  While public attention is statistically significant 
for both parties, there is a substantive difference.  For Democrats, a one-percent increase in public 
attention was expected to add 0.34 percent to a candidate’s vote share, compared to 0.88 percent 
for Republicans.   
Interestingly, there were some differences across party.  Endorsements were statistically 
significant for Democrats, but not for Republicans.  A one-percent increase in endorsements was 
expected to add 0.09 percent to a Democrat’s vote share.  The same was true for both cash-on-
hand and the number of candidates still in the race.  Counterintuitively, cash-on-hand was a 
negative predictor of Super Tuesday performance, while the number of candidates was positive.  
One possible explanation for the latter is that with more candidates in the race, voters were more 
concerned with viability.  With respect to the former, we admit to being puzzled by this result.  
A simple mean comparison indicates that the average vote share is inversely related to the number 
of candidates in the race.  Perhaps this finding is due to the winnowing process of presidential 
primaries: those candidates running come Super Tuesday may have more resources and a better 
ground game which may help the median candidate, although not the mathematically average 
one.  For instance, in reviewing the descriptive statistics, we found that median vote share 
increased as the field moved from six to seven candidates and the median vote share at three and 
four candidates was very similar.  Still, this finding is not consistent across all our models and we 
hesitate to read too much into it. 
 
Conclusion 
In this study, we explore which factors help explain the outcome of Super Tuesday races.  
While polling is a main determinant of Super Tuesday performance, it is not the only one.  Both 
public attention and media attention are consistently statistically and substantively significant, 
particularly when polling data are not available for a state.  The strong findings for polling, public 
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attention, and media attention indicate that elections are more complex than simply stating that 
the polling frontrunner will win a given state.  These complexities are highlighted by the lack of 
polling in many Super Tuesday caucus states.  Because of this, pundits and scholars need to 
examine additional data to understand and predict Super Tuesday races.  Both public attention 
and media attention are important indices to explore in this context.  Even when polling data are 
available, the industry has been hit with questions of its validity after some recent high-profile 
misses (Zukin 2015; Silver 2014).  Comparing polling results to other data can help scholars and 
pundits make better predictions and understand when polling could be wrong. 
One interesting component of our results is that, while there is explanatory overlap 
between Super Tuesday and early nomination contests, there are some key differences.  In terms 
of Haynes et al.’s (2004) resource triumvirate, polling and media attention matter while cash-on-
hand does not.  Moreover, we find that upstart candidates can use local media and public 
attention to win states even if they are at a financial disadvantage.  Those who are able to create 
considerable interest among primary voters were consistently able to outperform their 
challengers.  This finding is more optimistic for such candidates than previous studies of 
presidential primary results.  Future research should explore how candidates can create positive 
public attention moments for their campaign and how the timing of such moments could affect 
the primary process.  
Also worth noting is that candidates receive a bit of a boost in geographically proximal 
states (Norrander 1993).  The results are more mixed when considering states where candidates 
have a personal history, however.  This variable is only significant when polling data are 
unavailable or not included in a model.  This does not mean that candidates do not benefit from 
having their state host a Super Tuesday election.  Indeed, only four candidates lost their home 
state in this sample: Dennis Kucinich and Al Sharpton in 2008, Rick Santorum in 2012, and 
Marco Rubio in 2016.  The first two candidates were unlikely to win because they were not strong 
contenders for the nomination.  The last two cases are a bit more interesting.  Santorum lost his 
home state of Pennsylvania to Mitt Romney, 58 percent to 18 percent, at the end of April.  By 
this time in the primary, Romney had won 24 states to Santorum’s 10; Romney had won almost 
62 percent of the prior delegates.  In other words, Romney was the presumptive nominee fending 
off the last-ditch efforts of his opposition.  Rubio’s loss at the hands of Donald Trump came 
earlier in the primary process, six weeks after the Iowa caucuses, and represented the end of his 
campaign.  Rubio had won Minnesota and Washington, DC, prior to the March 15 Super 
Tuesday, but Trump entered the day with wins in 15 states and was beginning to receive stronger 
backing from GOP primary voters.  While other Republicans continued to challenge Trump for 
more than a month after March 15, his status as frontrunner was not in doubt. 
The final noteworthy observation from this study is that cash-on-hand and 
endorsements do not consistently help candidates win Super Tuesday races.  The null finding for 
financial resources underscores the fiscal reality of Super Tuesdays: in order to compete in at least 
five elections on one day requires a certain fundraising competence.  This reiterates the finding 
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from other scholars that fundraising is a necessary but insufficient condition for presidential 
primary success (Goff 2004; Adkins and Dowdle 2002; Mayer 2003).  This can be seen from a 
deeper dive into the data; in most election cycles, the candidates competing in Super Tuesdays 
were all relatively proficient fundraisers.  Among Democrats, every Super Tuesday in 2008 and 
2016 was contested by only two candidates – Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in 2008, and 
Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders in 2016.  Among Republicans, there were more candidates, 
but almost all of them had money.  Those candidates that lacked resources were still able to win 
some states, including Donald Trump, who had less than 10 percent of the field’s cash-on-hand 
in the first two 2016 Super Tuesdays. 
Based on these results, there are numerous avenues for future research on Super Tuesday 
elections.  First, polling, public attention, and media attention are interrelated.  Candidates who 
do well in one area typically do well in the other two.  The nature of these relationships could be 
explored in more depth, perhaps using case studies or a time-series analysis.  Second, underfunded 
candidates can eke out victories in demographically and socio-economically favorable states.  For 
example, Rick Santorum, despite winning the 2012 Iowa caucuses, was less organized than Mitt 
Romney.  Still, he was able to win numerous Super Tuesday states, such as North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, and Tennessee.   Which demographic and socio-economic factors made these states 
prime targets for his campaign?  By exploring these questions, scholars can better understand the 
nuances of presidential primaries and how we elect our chief executive. 
Finally, more work needs to be done to explore how campaigns strategically attempt to 
influence Super Tuesday voters.  Wendland’s (2017) recent book on campaign visits and 
presidential primaries is an important guide here.  He notes that visits play a prominent role in 
campaign strategy and can make a positive difference for some candidates.  Combining visits with 
survey data from Super Tuesday voters may help scholars better understand campaign effects in 
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Local Media Attention 28.5 26.2 15.2 0 72.3 
Public Attention 28.5 23.0 21.0 0 82.7 
Polling 26.3 25.9 17.7 0 84.5 
Prior Delegates 28.1 26.6 22.5 0 65.2 
Prior States 28.5 25 28.3 0 100.0 
Prior Caucus Wins 1.3 1.0 2.12 0 11.0 
Cash on Hand 28.5 24.8 19.9 -0.11 82.1 
Disbursements 28.5 28.7 16.6 0.28 61.4 
Vote Share 28.1 25.6 21.2 0 90.1 
